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Several studies have demonstrated that people with ASD and intact language skills still have problems
processing linguistic information in context. Given this evidence for reduced sensitivity to linguistic con-
text, the question arises how contextual information is actually processed by people with ASD. In this
study, we used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to examine context sensitivity in high-functioning
adultswith autistic disorder (HFA) and Asperger syndrome at two levels: at the level of sentence process-
ing and at the level of solving reasoning problems. We found that sentence context as well as reasoning





groups showed a typical N400 effect and a late positive component for the sentence conditions, and a
sustained negativity for the reasoning conditions. In contrast, the HFA group demonstrated neither an
N400 effect nor a sustained negativity. However, the HFA group showed a late positive component which
was larger for semantically anomalous sentences than congruent sentences. Because sentence context






Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by deficits
n social interaction and communication, and by restrictive, stereo-
yped and repetitive behaviors and narrow interests (DSM-IV,
994). BothAsperger syndromeandautistic disorderbelong toASD,
ndare characterizedbysimilar featuresbutdiffer inearly language
evelopment (DSM-IV, 1994). One core feature of ASD are deficits
n pragmatic language, which include difficulties in understanding
on-literal language like irony and metaphors (Dennis, Lazenby, &
ockyer, 2001; Happé, 1993; Martin & McDonald, 2004; Ozonoff
Miller, 1996). A possible account for such deficits is that people
ith ASD find it difficult to use context when computing meaning.
It has been demonstrated that individuals with autistic disor-
er or Asperger syndrome who have intact language skills, still
ave problemsprocessing linguistic information in context (Happé,
997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). In a homograph task, they
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oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.003ocesses are needed to arrive at a sentence interpretation.
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failed to use sentence context to derive the appropriate pronuncia-
tion of the homographs, for instance, when they had to pronounce
the homograph tear in a sentence like “In her dress/eye there was
a big tear” (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). Theywere also found to be less able to use contextual
information to make a global inference in a sentence arrangement
task, were less likely to choose a bridging inference to make a sce-
nario coherent if they had to select from a list of alternatives, and
were less able to use context to interpret ambiguous sentences
(Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000). These findings indicate that
people with ASD have difficulty understanding language in con-
text. Moreover, of the two subgroups, people with autistic disorder
had greater difficulty in using contextual information than people
withAsperger syndrome (Jolliffe&Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000). It has
beenargued that thesefindings support theweakcentral coherence
account of ASD, which claims that people with ASD have a process-
ing bias for details at the expense of the global picture (Frith, 2003;
Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). Given this evidence for reduced
sensitivity to linguistic context, the question arises how contextual
information is actually processed by people with ASD.
In the present work we used event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) to examine context sensitivity in high-functioning adults
with autistic disorder (HFA) and Asperger syndrome. ERPs have the
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an provide precise information about the time course of cognitive
rocesses. Thus ERPs can give us more insight into when particular
nformation is processed in the brain. We investigated the notion
f context sensitivity in autism at two levels: at the level of sen-
ence processing and at the level of solving reasoning problems.
oth require one to make use of earlier encountered information in
rder to interpret the incoming new information, though the last
entioned involves a more elaborate context requiring inference
aking and reasoning. In the following sections, we will introduce
hese topics in greater detail.
. Integrating words into context – the N400 effect
In ERP research a component called N400 has been proven to be
good tool to examine the online integration of lexical-semantic
nformation. The N400 is a negative deflection that peaks around
00ms after the onset of a word and is topologically distributed
ver central-parietal sites on the scalp. The N400 is elicited by
very content word, but its strength varies as a function of the
egree of semantic fit between a word and its context. For exam-
le, a semantically anomalous word in a sentence like “He spread
is warm bread with socks” elicits a larger N400 than the con-
ruent word butter in “He spread his warm bread with butter”
Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The N400 effect also occurs in sentences
hat are semantically appropriate but where words conflict with
xpectancy (Hagoort & Brown, 1994), world knowledge (Hagoort,
ald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004), or discourse context (Van
erkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999; Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, &
witserlood, 2003). In general, theN400 effect is seen as an index of
rocesses involved in the integrationof themeaningof aword intoa
epresentation of its preceding context, which could be established
y a word (Holcomb, Reder, Misra, & Grainger, 2005; Rugg, 1985),
sentence (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984), or a larger discourse
Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999; Van Berkum, Zwitserlood,
agoort, & Brown, 2003). As integration of a word into the context
ecomes harder because it does not satisfy semantic expectations,
he amplitude of the N400 increases (Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Van
erkum, Hagoort, et al., 1999).
Currently, evidence for N400 effects in autism is equivocal. For
xample, children with ASD failed to show any N400 effect when
hey had to detect words whose semantic category deviated from
thers in the same set, e.g., non-animal words in a set of animal
ords (Dunn & Bates, 2005; Dunn, Vaughan, Kreuzer, & Kurtzberg,
999). One limitation of these studies is that they failed to match
heASDchildren and the control childrenon intelligence andverbal
bilities. That is, the absence of an N400 effect might be attributed
o impaired verbal abilities or lower intelligence, and not to the
utistic condition itself. Other research demonstrated that chil-
ren with autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome had a similar
400 amplitude as controls for incongruent versus congruentword
airs, though in the children with autistic disorder the N400 effect
as delayed (Méndez, Sans, Abril, & Valdizan, 2009; Valdizan et
l., 2003). In adults with ASD, Strandburg et al. (1993) also found a
lear N400 effect formeaninglessword pairs relative tomeaningful
ord pairs (e.g. square wind/vicious dog). Also at sentence level, an
400-like effect was found when adults with ASD read semanti-
ally incongruent sentences while MEGs were recorded, but there
ere differences in spatial distribution between the ASD group and
ontrol group (Braeutigam, Swithenby, & Bailey, 2008).
In the present study, we used highly constraining sentences
o investigate the time course of linguistic integration in high-
unctioning adults with ASD. By ‘highly constraining’ we mean
entences that strongly drive semantic expectations about the
pcomingfinalword, for instance, “Finally the climbers reached the
op of the . . .”. It is known that when listening to or reading suchgia 48 (2010) 2940–2951 2941
a constraining sentence, people very rapidly make specific predic-
tions about the continuation of the sentence as it unfolds. When
semantic expectations are violated (“. . . tulip”), then anN400 effect
occurs relative to the expected word (“. . . mountain”). We hypoth-
esized that if high-functioning adults with ASD make less use of
sentence context and focus more on the meaning of the individ-
ual words, their semantic expectations might be less strong, which
should give rise to reduced N400 effects. Because adults with HFA
and Asperger syndrome may differ in the way they process linguis-
tic information, we will explore whether these subgroups differ in
semantic processing (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000; Méndez
et al., 2009; Valdizan et al., 2003).
3. Defeasible reasoning – taking exceptions into account
So far we have discussed the integration of words into a sen-
tence context. However, the primary aim of the present work is to
examine how high-functioning people with ASD make use of con-
text informationwhen reasoningwith conditionals,which involves
amore elaborate context. Conditionals are of the form “If P, thenQ”.
A characteristic feature of everyday conditional inferences is that
they allow for exceptions. In other words, conditional inferences
are defeasible: they can be revised in the light of new information.
Exceptions to conditional inferences are quite common in everyday
life. For instance, we expect a lamp to light if we switch it on, but
we will withdraw this inference if the lamp turns out to be bro-
ken. Because one has to adjust one’s conclusions when the context
changes, defeasible reasoning seems to require mental flexibility
(Pijnacker et al., 2009).
In a previous behavioral study, we found that high-functioning
adults with ASD were good at conditional reasoning, but were
less sensitive to exceptions that prevent a conclusion from being
drawn, compared to matched controls (Pijnacker et al., 2009). We
suggested that it is exception-handling that is the difficult part
of defeasible reasoning for people with ASD. Exception-handling
requires that we ignore possible exceptions as long as there is
no evidence thereof. That is, we apply a so-called closed-world
assumption with regard to exceptions. For instance, in “If I switch
the lamp on and nothing abnormal is the case, then it will light”, we
assume that there is indeed nothing abnormal the case as long as
we have no evidence for exceptions (Pijnacker et al., 2009; for a
detailed description, see Stenning & Van Lambalgen, 2005, 2008).
However, if an exception becomes salient – e.g. a broken lamp, then
the original closed-world assumption cannot be maintained any-
more. This may prevent people from drawing the conclusion that
the lamp will light. The important thing is that one must disre-
gard all possible exceptions as long as there is no evidence thereof
(i.e. apply the closed-world assumption), but adjust the closed-
world assumption when the context changes. Given the evidence
of impaired exception-handling in ASD, the question arises how
defeasible inferences are processed by people with ASD.
In this studyweemployedaparadigmthatwepreviouslyused to
explore the electrophysiological signature of defeasible reasoning
in a group of college students (Pijnacker, Geurts, Van Lambalgen,
Buitelaar, & Hagoort, in press), and which is a modified version of
the suppression task (Byrne, 1989, 1991). Participants were visu-
ally presented with modus ponens inferences. Modus ponens is a
simple argument form, which has two premises. The first premise
is the conditional If P, then Q, which states that P impliesQ. The sec-
ond premise asserts the first part of the conditional (P). From these
two premises we can logically conclude that the consequent of the
conditional (Q) must be true (for examples, see Table 2).
Inferences were preceded either by a congruent context or
a disabling context. The disabling context contained a possible
exception with regard to the conditional, and was introduced to





























































Description of the matching variables age, verbal intelligence (VIQ), performance
intelligence (PIQ) and full scale intelligence (FIQ) for the control group and ASD
subgroups.M=mean, SD= standard deviation. There were no significant differences
between the matching variables (all p> .10).
Control (n=18) Asperger (n=12) HFA (n=6)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Age 26 (6) 18–41 28 (6) 20–42 31 (7) 24–40
In addition to the 80 experimental reasoning problems, 80 filler reasoning prob-
lems were used, which included 40 modus ponens inferences with an incongruent
conclusion, 20 affirmations of the consequent inferences (AC)with a congruent con-
clusion and 20 with an incongruent conclusion (see Table 3 for examples). All fillers
were preceded by a congruent context. Fillers were included to reduce the pre-942 J. Pijnacker et al. / Neurops
licit suppression of modus ponens. Thus it was the context that
as decisive for whether a conclusion was drawn or not. However,
ne may argue that there could be some alternative scenario that
verrules the disabling context, e.g. that Lisa bought new lenses
r received a refractive surgery, which causes the conclusion still
o hold in the presence of a disabling context. However, it is pre-
isely closed-world reasoning that comes into play here: as long as
here is no information about alternatives or exceptions, one can
ssume that all such things are not the case. It has been shown by
tenning and Van Lambalgen (2008) that people indeed apply the
losed-world assumption when reasoning with conditionals.
It is important to note that in the original suppression task
Byrne, 1989, 1991; but also see Pijnacker et al., 2009) possible
xceptions were presented in the form of a conditional. In order
o enable good time-locking to critical words, we had to modify
he original task in such a way that the presentation of exceptions
ecame more explicit. As we will see later, this may have had an
ffect on participants’ performance.
In a group of college students (n=18) we found that an elec-
rophysiological brain response occurred just within 250ms when
conclusion could be withdrawn because of a possible exception
Pijnacker et al., in press). We observed a widely distributed sus-
ained negativity from about 250ms until the end of the epoch at
he final word of the conclusion in the disabling context relative
o the congruent context. The observed negativity differed from
hat of semantic anomaly at least in its morphology and temporal
rofile. However, we could not conclude that the effect was qual-
tatively different from a N400 effect, because it had an N400-like
entral scalp distribution. We suggested that the observed negativ-
ty could reflect additional processing because a default inference
ust be revised to incorporate an exception. Alternatively, it could
e associated with more complex, inference-driven interpretive
rocesses (Pijnacker et al., in press).
In the present study, we applied the above described ERP
aradigm to people with ASD and matched controls, following up
n the earlier behavioral findings that high-functioning adultswith
SD are less sensitive to exceptions when reasoning with condi-
ionals (Pijnacker et al., 2009). We explored how high-functioning
eople with autistic disorder (HFA) and adults with Asperger syn-
rome make use of context information when reasoning with
onditionals compared to matched controls.
To summarize,wewill investigate thenotionof context sensitiv-
ty in high-functioning autism at two levels: at the level of sentence
rocessing and at the level of solving reasoning problems. Both
equire one tomakeuseof earlier encountered information in order
o interpret the incoming new information. However, in the sen-
ence conditions – the N400 paradigm – there is a local violation of
eaning: a word occurs that does not semantically fit into the pre-
eding context. In contrast, in the reasoning conditions the words
hemselves do not involve a semantic violation, but it is the propo-
itional content that may clash with the prior context. Our primary
im is to investigate how people with autism deal with context
uring reasoning, but by including a standard N400 paradigm we
an explore whether there is a specific difficulty with using con-




Twenty high-functioning adults with ASD participated in this study, of whom
8 were included in the final analysis (11 males). Two participants with ASD were
xcluded due to low signal quality. The ASD group consisted of two subgroups based
n DSM-IV criteria: a group of participants with Asperger syndrome (n=12) and a
roupof high-functioningparticipantswith autistic disorder (n=6, henceforthHFA).
Most ASD participantswere recruited from theDepartment Psychiatry Radboud
edical Centre Nijmegen, which is specialized in diagnosing (high-functioning)VIQ 118 (8) 105–135 123 (13) 100–142 116 (10) 103–128
PIQ 122 (10) 104–138 116 (11) 101–130 120 (15) 104–144
FIQ 121 (7) 108–139 122 (12) 101–140 119 (10) 109–134
adults with ASD. We did not include participants with IQs below 100, because of
the demanding task. The diagnoses of autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome
were established through expert clinical evaluation based on the DSM-IV criteria
for these disorders (DSM-IV, 1994). Clinical diagnosis was supplemented with the
AutismDiagnostic Interview–Revised (ADI-R),which is a structureddevelopmental
diagnostic interview with parents or caregivers, and is based on behavior of the par-
ticipant at the age of 4–5 years (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). Two participants
did not meet the onset cut-off, and two participants scored below the cut-off on
one of the other scales. This could be attributed to the fact that their parents could
not recall the relevant developmental information. For four participants no parents
or caretakers were available, and hence the ADI-R could not be administered. In all
these cases, the clinical diagnosis of autism was beyond doubt, meaning that they
satisfied the full DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome, estab-
lished by thorough clinical assessment by experts. Peoplewith a PDD-NOS diagnosis
were excluded as well as those with severe comorbid axis-I conditions like major
depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, or ADHD.
Data of the ASD subgroups were compared to data of 18 matched controls (11
males). For inclusion, control participants were screened to exclude those with
psychiatric, neurological or developmental disorders. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the groups with respect to age and intelligence scales (verbal,
performance and full scale intelligence) as assessed by the Wechsler Intelligence
Scales (see Table 1,p> .10 for all variables). All participantswere right-handednative
speakers of Dutch, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants
signed an informed consent form, and received reimbursement for participation.
The study was approved by the local medical ethics committee.
4.2. Materials
The sentence conditions consisted of 80 Dutch sentences that ended with a
word that was either semantically incongruent (40 items) or congruent (40 items)
with the preceding sentence context, like, “Finally the climbers reached the top of
the tulip/mountain”. Materials were taken from a previous study by Van den Brink,
Brown, and Hagoort (2001). Final words were matched for number of letters and
frequency. Mean cloze probability1 of the sentences was 94% (range 80–100%). Two
different stimulus lists were created to counterbalance congruency so that no par-
ticipant saw the same item more than once. Each stimulus list was presented to an
equal number of participants in the control group as well as in the ASD group.
For the reasoning conditions, we created 80 reasoning problems in Dutch. All
reasoning problems had the inference form of modus ponens (If P then Q; P, there-
fore Q). Because the ERP technique requires many trials per condition, we could not
include other inference forms (i.e. modus tollens, denial of the antecedent, and affir-
mation of de consequent). We chose to use modus ponens, because this inference
form is the most simple and straightforward conditional inference. It is endorsed
by most adults, and moreover, children as young as the age of five can make modus
ponens inferences with a variety of materials (e.g. familiar, abstract, counterfac-
tual). In contrast, the valid inference modus tollens is much less often endorsed
than modus ponens (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993)
Reasoning problems were preceded by a congruent context or a disabling con-
text (Table 2). The disabling context contained a possible exception or precondition
with regard to the conditional. Congruent contexts and disabling contextswere kept
as similar as possible with regard to syntactic structure and sentence length. There
were no significant differences in sentence length between the congruent and dis-
abling contexts (p> .10). Final words of the sentences were never longer than 12
letters to avoid eye movements and average final word length was 6.7 letters.1 Cloze probability is determined by measuring the probability that a particular
word is given on a sentence completion task. The higher the cloze probability, the
more a particular word is expected.
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Table 2
Two examples of the experimental conditions. MP=modus ponens.
Condition Sentence type Example
MP-disabling Disabling context Lisa probably lost a contact
lens.
Premise 1 If Lisa is going to play
hockey, then she will wear
contact lenses.
Premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey.
Conclusion Lisa will wear contact
lenses.
MP-disabling Disabling context Lately Stefan usually parks
his Mercedes in the garage.
Premise 1 If it is raining, then the
Mercedes will become wet.
Premise 2 It is raining.
Conclusion The Mercedes will become
wet.
MP-congruent Congruent context Lisa has recently bought
contact lenses.
Premise 1 If Lisa is going to play
hockey, then she will wear
contact lenses.
Premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey.
Conclusion Lisa will wear contact
lenses.
MP-congruent Congruent context Stefan bought a Mercedes
from his savings a few
weeks ago.
Premise 1 If it is raining, then the
Mercedes will become wet.
Premise 2 It is raining.
Conclusion The Mercedes will become
wet.
Table 3
Fillers. MP=modus ponens, AC=affirmation of the consequent.
Fillers Sentence type Example
MP-incongruent Congruent context Mark lives on a farm far
away from the town.
Premise 1 If Mark is going to the
town, then he will go by
scooter.
Premise 2 Mark is going to the town.
Incongruent conclusion Mark will go by bike.
AC-congruent Congruent context Golf is becoming a popular
sport.
Premise 1 If Luc is going to play golf,
then he will wear a hat.
Premise 2 Luc will wear a hat.
Congruent conclusion Luc is going to play golf.
AC-incongruent Congruent context Miriam likes water sports.
Premise 1 If Miriam is going to the
lake, then she will go
rowing.
Premise 2 Miriam will go rowing.
Incongruent conclusion Miriam is going to the
forest.
Fig. 1. Setup of how stimuli were presented. Times are in milliseconds, w stands for wor
and the conclusion were presented word-by-word for 300ms+300ms interstimulus integia 48 (2010) 2940–2951 2943
dictability of the materials and to balance for response types (i.e. to evoke ‘maybe’
and ‘no’ responses). In total, each participant read 160 reasoning problems: 40
reasoning problems in a disabling context, 40 reasoning problems in a congruent
context, and 80 fillers. As in the sentence conditions, the two versions of the rea-
soning problems were counterbalanced across two lists. Thus no participant saw
the same reasoning problem more than once. Each list was presented to an equal
number of participants in the control group as well as in the ASD group.
4.3. Procedure
The reasoning conditions were presented first, followed by the sentence con-
ditions. Participants received written instructions about the reasoning conditions,
in which they were instructed that they had to decide whether a conclusion fol-
lowed from short stories. They were instructed to read all sentences carefully
and to respond by pressing one of the buttons ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘maybe’ on a but-
ton box. Participants were instructed to sit quietly in a comfortable position and
not to blink during the word-by-word presentation of the sentences. Stimuli were
presented in a white font against a black background, using Presentation 10.2 soft-
ware.
The reasoning materials were partly presented in whole sentences and partly
word-by-word when good time-locking was critical. The trial sequence was as
follows (see Fig. 1). Each trial started with a 3000ms fixation cross (+) on the
screen. Then the context sentence was presented for a duration of 2000ms plus
an additional 250ms times the number of words. After the context sentence, the
first part of the conditional (“If. . ., then”) appeared for 2000ms plus an additional
250ms times the number ofwords. Subsequent sentenceswere presentedword-by-
word. Each word was displayed for 300ms, followed by a blank screen for another
300ms, after which the next word appeared. The conclusion was preceded by
three hedges (###) to indicate that the conclusion was following. After the final
word of the conclusion, there was a 1000ms blank screen before the response
options MAYBE–YES–NO appeared on the screen for 4000ms. There were blank
screens between sentences. Reasoning problems were presented in blocks of ten
trials. After each block there was an optional break. The session started with a
practice block of ten reasoning problems to familiarize the participant with the
procedure.
After the reasoning conditions, the sentence conditions were presented in serial
visual presentation (300ms+300ms interstimulus interval, and a 3000ms fixation
crossbetweensentences forblinks). Participantswere instructed to read for compre-
hension only, and tominimize eye blinks during theword-by-wordpresentation.No
additional task demands were imposed. There were five blocks of sentences with
optional breaks in between. The whole EEG session lasted approximately 75min
without breaks.
4.4. EEG recording
The EEG was recorded from 29 electrode sites across the scalp using an Easy-
cap with Ag/AgCl-electrodes. Recordings were referenced to the left mastoid. Three
additional electrodes were placed to monitor eye movements. Vertical EOG was
recorded by placing an electrode below the right eye, and FP1 was used for above
the eye. Horizontal EOG was recorded via a right-to-left canthal montage. All EEG
and EOG channels were amplified using BrainAmp DC amplifiers. A band-pass filter
was applied from 0.016 to 125Hz. The EEG and EOG signals were recorded and dig-
itized using Brain Vision Recorder software with a sampling frequency of 500Hz.
Impedances were kept below 10k for EOG and below 5k for all other electrodes.
4.5. Data analysis
For the analysis of the behavioral responses of the reasoning conditions, per-
centages of accepted items (‘yes’ responses) per condition were calculated. Because
of the non-normal distribution of the response data, nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis
tests (exact, two-sided) were used to examine whether responses were different
across groups per context.
Prior to analyzing, EEGdatawere preprocessed using Brain VisionAnalyzer soft-
ware. EEG data were re-referenced to the mean of the two mastoids, and corrected
for eye movement artifacts using an algorithm described by Gratton, Coles, and
Donchin (1983). Data were filtered off-line with a 30Hz low-pass filter. Data were
segmented from 150ms before to 1000ms after the critical words (final word in
d length per sentence, white boxes represent blank screens. Premise 1b, premise 2
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he sentence conditions, and final words of premise 1, premise 2, and conclusion
n reasoning conditions). Baseline correction used the 150ms interval preceding
he onset of the critical word. Trials containing artifacts (9%) were rejected. For the
easoning conditions the mean number of accepted trials was M=36.9 (SD=3.5,
ange 25–40), and for the N400 conditions the mean number of accepted trials was
=35.4 (SD=4.7, range 23–40). Rejected trials were equally distributed across con-
itionsandgroups (p> .10). Foreachparticipant, averagewaveformswerecomputed
cross all remaining trials per condition.
All analyseswere conducted on themean amplitudes of ERPs evoked by the crit-
cal words over two latency windows based on the N400 literature: a 250–500ms
atencywindow(N400effect), anda600–900ms latencywindow(latepositive com-
onent). For good comparison,weused the same latencywindows for the analysis of
he reasoning conditions. The effects were evaluated in repeated measures ANOVAs
ith the factors Context (congruent, incongruent/disabling), Quadrant (left ante-
ior, right anterior, left posterior, right anterior), andGroup (control, Asperger, HFA).
lectrodes were assigned to quadrants as follows: left anterior (F3, F7, FC1, FC5, C3),
ight anterior (F4, F8, FC2, FC6, C4), left posterior (CP1, CP5, P3, P7, O1), and right
osterior (CP2, CP6, P4, P8, O2). Interactionswith the factor Quadrantwere followed
p by single quadrant analyses. Separate ANOVAs were conducted for the midline
lectrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz). Because our primary interest was in whether the effect
f Context differed by group, planned follow-up analyses entailed separate ANOVAs
er group to test for a Context effect. For all analyses, we applied a Huynh-Feldt
orrection for violations of sphericity when necessary (Huynh & Feldt, 1976). In
hese cases, the corrected p-values with the original degrees of freedom will be
eported.
ig. 2. Grand average ERPs (Fz, Cz and Pz) of the congruent and incongruent linguisti
isplay the latency windows in which the effects were evaluated. Black line = congruent co
nterpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to thgia 48 (2010) 2940–2951
5. Results
First, we will discuss the group results of the sentence condi-
tions. To gain more insight into the variation within the groups,
we will also present the individual participant data. Next, we will
discuss the results of the reasoning conditions, for both the group
data and the individual participant data.
5.1. Sentence conditions
Fig. 2displays thegrandaveragewaveformsof the sentence con-
ditions containing semantically congruent and incongruent final
words. Visual inspection of these waveforms shows a N1–P2 com-
plex for each group, which is characteristic for visual stimuli.
Furthermore, the control group and the Asperger group demon-
strate a negative shift for the incongruent condition relative to the
congruent condition, which appears to be absent in the HFA group.
Finally, a late positive component for the incongruent condition
compared to the congruent condition is apparent in all groups.
Statistical analysis in the 250–500ms latency window demon-
strated a main effect of Context (F(1,33) =15.5, p< .001), a Context
c condition time-locked to the onset of the sentence-final word. The grey boxes
ndition, red line = incongruent condition. Negative values are plotted upward. (For
e web version of the article.)











































eig. 3. The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between th
ondition time-locked to the sentence-final word, in the latency windows 250–500
y Quadrant interaction (F(3,99) =6.46, p= .001), and a Context by
roup interaction (F(2,33) =3.91,p= .030). Themidlineanalysis also
evealed a main effect of Context (F(1,33) =12.9, p= .001), and a
arginal Context by Group interaction (F(2,33) =3.19, p= .054).
Separate analyses per group in the 250–500ms latency window
emonstrated a main effect of Context for both the control group2
F(1,17) =26.0, p< .001) and the Asperger group (F(1,11) =5.07,
= 0.046). Moreover, the Asperger group showed a Context by
uadrant interaction (F(3,33) =4.91,p= .014). Single quadrant anal-
ses indicated that in the Asperger group there was a main effect
f Context in the right anterior region (F(1,11) =9.86, p= .009),
nd a trend for the left anterior region (F(1,11) =4.81, p=0.051)
nd the midline region (F(1,11) =4.19, p=0.065). The HFA group
id not show a significant main effect of Context (F(1,5) = 1.26,
> .10), but there was a marginal Context by Quadrant interaction
F(3,15) =3.15, p=0.056). However, the analyses for the separate
uadrants and midline failed to show any significant effects for
ontext (all p> .09).
The next latency window in which the effects were tested
as from 600 to 900ms. For this latency window, the repeated
easures ANOVA showed a main effect of Context (F(1,33) =28.0,
< .001), indicating that the incongruent condition ismore positive
han the congruent condition, and a Context by Quadrant interac-
ion (F(3,99) =14.2, p< .001), but no Context by Group interaction
F(2,33) =1.81, p= .18). The midline analysis also showed a main
ffect of Context (F(1,33) =28.0, p< .001), but no Context by Group
nteraction (F(2,33) =2.12, p= .14).
Planned follow-up analyses confirmed that there is indeed
late positive component present in each group (control:
(1,17) =4.55, p= .048; Asperger: F(1,11) =12.1, p= .005; HFA:
(1,5) = 37.9,p= .002). In addition, in the control groupandAsperger
roup a Context by Quadrant interaction was observed (control:
(3,51) =9.16, p< .001; Asperger: F(3,33) =13.0, p< .001). Single
uadrant analyses revealed that in both the control group and
2 As can be seen in Fig. 2, there are early differences in the N1–P2 complex in the
ontrol group. Statistical comparison revealed that there is indeed an early signifi-
antnegativeeffect in the0–200ms latencywindow, indicating that the incongruent
ondition is more negative than the congruent condition. This early effect was nei-
her present in the ASD groups nor in the previous college students’ data. Because
he N400 effect in controls could possibly be a consequence of this early difference,
e checked whether the N400 effect was still present in controls if we took into
ccount the unexplained early difference in the 0–200ms latency window by sub-
racting the mean amplitude in that latency window from each data point. It turned
ut that the N400 effect in controls remained significant when corrected for the
arly effect (F(1,17) =19.0, p< .001).s evoked by the incongruent linguistic condition relative to the congruent linguistic
00–900ms.
Asperger group, there was a main effect of Context in left and right
posterior regions (control: F(1,17) =18.2, p= .001, F(1,17) =6.38,
p= .022; Asperger: F(1,11) =36.7, p< .001, F(1,11) =15.5, p= .002),
and the midline region (control: F(1,17) =4.56, p= .048; Asperger:
F(1,11) =10.0,p= .009). The topographical distributions for theCon-
text effects per group can be seen in Fig. 3.
Figs. 4 and 5 display the N400 effect and the late positive com-
ponent for the sentence conditions per individual participant per
group. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the majority of the control and
Asperger participants demonstrated an N400 effect for the incon-
gruent condition relative to the congruent condition, butwith some
variation in individual effect sizes. In theHFAgroup, theN400effect
appears to be reduced or absent. In contrast, all HFA participants
demonstrated a large late positive component for the incongruent
condition compared to the congruent condition, like most control
and Asperger participants (Fig. 5).
5.2. Reasoning conditions
The groups did not differ significantly on the percentage of
accepted inferences in the congruent condition (H(2) = 1.28,p> .10),
as well as in the disabling condition (H(2) = 4.20, p> .10), although
the HFA group seems to show more accepted inferences in the
disabling condition than the Asperger group and control group
(see Fig. 6). Separate comparisons between the subgroups for the
disabling condition yielded no significant effects (HFA–control:
U=32.5, p= .16; HFA–Asperger: U=16.0, p= .062).
Fig. 7 displays the grand average waveforms of the congruent
and disabling condition time-locked to the onset of the final word
of the conclusion. Visual inspection of the waveforms shows for
each group an N1–P2 complex. Moreover, visual inspection reveals
a large negative shift for the disabling condition relative to the
congruent condition in the control group and the Asperger group,
which appears to be reduced in the HFA group.
Statistical analysis confirmed that in the latency window
from 250 to 500ms, the disabling condition was significantly
more negative than the congruent condition (F(1,33) =14.6,
p= .001). The midline analysis also confirmed an effect of Con-
text (F(1,33) =16.5, p< .001). There were no Context by Group
interactions (F(2,33) =1.18, p= .32, F(2,33) = .90, p= .42). Planned
follow-up analyses per group revealed that both the control group
and the Asperger group demonstrated a main effect of Context
(control: F(1,17) =15.8, p= .001; Asperger: F(1,11) =7.96, p= .017).
In contrast, the HFA group failed to show any effect of Context
(F(1,5) = 1.10, p> .10).













iig. 4. Mean amplitude of theN400 effect (incongruent conditionminus congruent c
articipant. Negative values are plotted upward.
In the next latency window from 600 to 900ms, the repeated
easures ANOVA yielded a main effect of Context (F(1,33) =14.2,
= .001), and a Context by Quadrant interaction (F(3,99) =11.3,
< .001), but no Context by Group interaction (F(2,33) =1.60,
= .22). The midline analysis also showed a main effect of
ontext (F(1,33) =11.5, p= .002) and no Context by Group inter-
ction (F(2,33) =1.43, p= .26). Planned follow-up analyses per
roup revealed a main effect of Context for the control group
F(1,17) =18.0, p= .001) and the Asperger group(F(1,11) =7.86,
= .017), and a Context by Quadrant interaction in both groups
ig. 5. Mean amplitude of the late positive component (incongruent condition minus con
ndividual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.on in latencywindow250–500ms averaged over FCz, Cz, and Pz) for each individual
(control: F(3,51) =6.62, p= .004; Asperger: F(3,33) =5.73, p= .10).
A main effect of Context was found for every separate quad-
rant and for the midline region in both groups (all p< .05). In
contrast, the HFA group did not demonstrate a main effect of
Context (F(1,5) < 1, p> .10), but there was a significant Context
by Quadrant interaction (F(3,15) =5.12, p=0.012). However, the
analyses for the separate quadrants and midline failed to show
any significant effects for Context (all p> .10). The topographi-
cal distributions for the Context effects per group can be seen in
Fig. 8.
gruent condition in latency window 250–500ms averaged over Pz and P3) for each
J. Pijnacker et al. / Neuropsycholo
Fig. 6. Percentage of accepted inferences (‘yes’ responses) for the congruent context
and the disabling context. Error bars represent 1 S.E. of the means.
Fig. 7. Grand average ERPs (Fz, Cz and Pz) of the congruent and disabling reasoning cond
display the latency windows in which the effects were evaluated. Black line = congruent
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to thgia 48 (2010) 2940–2951 2947
Consistent with previous college students’ data, ERPs time-
locked to the onset of the final word of the first premise and the
second premise did not demonstrate any significant effects of Con-
text in both latency windows (all p> .10).
Figs. 9 and 10 display the negative shift for the reasoning con-
ditions per individual participant per group. As is evident from
Figs. 9 and 10, the majority of the control participants and the
Asperger participants showed anegative shift for the disabling con-
dition compared to the congruent condition, though with some
variation in individual effect sizes. In the HFA group only two out
of six participants showed a clear negative shift.
Inorder todetermine towhat extent the sizeof thenegative shift
in the reasoning conditionswas related to thebehavioral responses,
we computed Pearson correlations between the sustained negativ-
ity (mean amplitude difference averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz in
the 250–900ms latency window as the effect is sustained over this
whole latency window) and percentage of accepted inferences in
the disabling condition for the control group and ASD group sep-
arately. It turned out that there were no significant correlations
between the sustained negativity and the percentage of accepted
ition time-locked to the onset of the final word of the conclusion. The grey boxes
condition, red line =disabling condition. Negative values are plotted upward. (For
e web version of the article.)
2948 J. Pijnacker et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 2940–2951
Fig. 8. The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs evoked by the disabling reasoning condition relative to the congruent reasoning

















nig. 9. Mean amplitude of the sustained negativity (disabling condition minus con
ndividual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
nferences in thedisabling condition forbothgroups (p> .10),which
s consistent with previous college students’ results.
Moreover, to investigate whether the two manipulations may
ely on the same cognitive resources, we looked whether the size
f the N400 effect (mean amplitude difference averaged over FCz,
z and Pz in the 250–500ms latency window) and the late pos-
tive component (mean amplitude difference averaged over FCz,
z and Pz in the 600–900ms latency window) in the sentence
anipulation was related to the size of the sustained negativ-
ty (mean amplitude difference averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz in
he 250–900ms latency window) in the reasoning manipulation.
earson correlations revealed no significant correlation between
he N400 effect and the sustained negativity for the control group
p> .10), but a weak trend for the ASD group (p= .066, r= .44). There
ere no significant correlations between the late positive compo-
ent and the sustained negativity (both p> .10). Finally, Pearsont condition in latency window 250–500ms averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz) for each
correlations between verbal intelligence and the ERP effects of both
manipulations revealed no significant effects (all p≥ .10).
6. Discussion
In the present study we explored the online processing of con-
text information – sentence context as well as reasoning context
– in autism spectrum disorders (ASD), following up on behavioral
research indicating that people with ASD fail to process linguis-
tic information in context (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997;
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). One aim was to investigate whether
high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (HFA) and Asperger
syndrome make use of sentence context to build up semantic pre-
dictions about the continuation of the sentence. For this purpose,
ERPs were recorded while participants read sentences that had a
semantically congruent or an anomalous ending.






































aig. 10. Mean amplitude of the sustained negativity (disabling condition minus con
ndividual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
The results indicated that sentence context had an immedi-
te ERP effect in adults with Asperger syndrome and matched
ontrols. Both groups showed typical larger N400 amplitudes for
ords thatwere semantically anomalous in the prior sentence con-
ext than words that were semantically congruent, although the
400 effect in the Asperger group was more pronounced over the
ight hemisphere than in the control group. In contrast, in the HFA
roup sentence context did not appear to modulate the ERP brain
esponse immediately, as an N400 effect was absent. However, the
FA group showed a late positive component which was larger for
emantically anomalous sentences than congruent sentences, like
n the control and the Asperger group.
Late positive components have been observed more often in
400 paradigms (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Holcomb, 1988;
uottonen, Revonsuo, & Lang, 1996; Salmon & Pratt, 2002; Severens
Hartsuiker, 2009; Van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Vissers, & Chwilla,
010), but have not consistently found across studies (e.g. Hagoort
t al., 2004; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984; Van Berkum, Hagoort,
t al., 1999). There is a lack of consensus about the functional
nterpretation of this late positive component, but it seems to
ave a different role than the N400 effect (Juottonen et al., 1996;
almon & Pratt, 2002). Several accounts allude to processes related
o semantic memory, e.g. extensive retrieval of information from
emantic memory in the course of arriving at an interpretation
Coulson & Van Petten, 2002), extended retrieval from semantic
emory and updating the contents of working memory with the
etrieved information (Van Petten, Kutas, Kluender, Mitchiner, &
cIsaac, 1991), an attention-demanding process after more auto-
atic semantic memory processes (Juottonen et al., 1996), or
ctive search in semanticmemory due to violations of expectations
Schwartz, Kutas, Butters, Paulsen, & Salmon, 1996). Others have
uggested that the late positive component might be indicative
f a delayed and more elaborate interpretive process (Nieuwland
Van Berkum, 2005), or post-lexical processes (Holcomb, 1988).
inally, the late positive component has been argued to be an
ndex of a monitoring process that triggers reanalysis when inte-
ration fails (Severens & Hartsuiker, 2009; Van de Meerendonk et
l., 2010).t condition in latency window 600–900ms averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz) for each
The question that arises is why the HFA group demonstrated a
late positive component but not the typical N400 effect in response
to semantic anomalies. Since participants always mentioned the
anomalous sentences when they were debriefed, it is unlikely that
they did not notice the semantic anomalies. It is therefore more
plausible that inHFA semantic anomalieswere not detected imme-
diately, as reflected by the reduced N400 effect, and that a delayed
and more extended process was used to arrive at a sentence inter-
pretation, as indexed by the late positive component. In contrast,
the Asperger group and control group were immediately sensitive
to sentence context, as reflected by the N400 effect to anomalous
words, followed by a late positive component suggesting an effort-
ful attempt to make sense of the anomalous sentence. Remarkably,
the pattern we found in HFA does not seem to be specific to autism.
For instance, Ditman and Kuperberg (2007) found no N400 effect
in people with schizophrenia but did find a late positive compo-
nent for causally unrelated discourse scenarios relative to causally
related ones.Moreover, older people showed a reducedN400 effect
for semantic anomalies but a similar late positive component as
young people (Günter, Jackson, & Mulder, 1992).
Another, and more primary, aim of the present work was to
examine how high-functioning adults with HFA and Asperger syn-
drome make use of context information when reasoning with
conditionals. For that purpose, ERPs were recorded while partic-
ipants read conditional reasoning problems, which were preceded
by a congruent context or a disabling context that contained a
possible exception that could prevent people from drawing the
conclusion. In comparison with the sentence manipulation where
a word did not semantically fit into the prior context, the words in
the reasoning manipulation fitted well into the preceding context,
but it was the propositional content that did not match with the
preceding context.
In contrast to our previous behavioral findings, both the
Asperger group and the HFA group suppressed the conclusion at
the same rate as the control group when a possible exception was
provided (Pijnacker et al., 2009). Due to ERP constraints, excep-
tions had to be presented more explicitly in the current study than
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he reasoning process. This explanation is supported by research
ndicating that people with ASD have trouble processing implicit
nformation (Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg, & Stegge, 2009; Dennis
t al., 2001). Our data suggest that when exceptions are sufficiently
xplicit, high-functioning adults with ASD cease to have difficulties
aking exceptions into account when reasoning with conditionals.
or clinical practice and treatment, this finding underlines that it
ay be important to be more explicit than usual when communi-
ating with people with ASD.
While there were no observable performance differences, the
eural processing of defeasible inferences appears to be different
n high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (HFA). Whereas
he Asperger group showed a similar brain response as the control
roup for the disabling condition relative to the congruent condi-
ion, context had no differential ERP effect in the HFA group. When
he conclusion did not fit with the preceding context, both the
sperger group and the control group demonstrated a sustained
egativity that started justwithin 250ms after the onset of the final
ord of the conclusion. This finding suggests that defeasible rea-
oning is an immediate process. As mentioned in the introduction,
he sustained negativity may either reflect additional processing
ecause a default inference must be revised to incorporate the
ossible exception, ormore complex, inference-driven interpretive
rocesses (Pijnacker et al., in press). Our ERP results suggest that
ontext hadno immediate effect in theHFAgroup, in contrast to the
sperger group and the control group. However, by the time HFA
articipants were required to make a response, contextual infor-
ation had been taken into account, as there was a normal pattern
f behavioral responses. This suggests that the participants with
FA made use of context information, but in a less automatic and
ore effortful way than is the case in controls.
One should note that therewas no relationship between the size
f the N400 effect and the size of the sustained negativity in the
ontrol group, but in the ASD group there was a weak trend that
he size of the individual’s ERP effects correlated across the two
anipulations. This finding suggests that the two manipulations
ay be relying on overlapping cognitive resources, at least in ASD,
nd hence that they may be dependent.
One limitation of the current study is that the group sizes were
elatively small in particular for the HFA group. We took effort
ncluding a homogeneous ASD group of adults without intellectual
isabilities, without severe co-morbodity, and sufficient capac-
ty to perform the task. This resulted in small sample sizes, and
n consequence reduced the statistical power of our effects. We
hould therefore be tentative in interpreting the absence of the
ustained negativity and the N400 effect in adults with HFA, which
ould be possibly due to a lack of statistical power. Nonetheless,
he individual data revealed that the patterns were consistent
cross participants in all groups. Testing with larger samples will
e needed to confirm our results. Moreover, for a more com-
lete understanding it is necessary to investigate how younger or
ower-functioning groups with ASD process semantic anomalies
nd exceptions.
A final comment is in order concerning the different patternswe
ound for adults with HFA and Asperger syndrome. Until now, it is
till a matter of debate whether Asperger syndrome is a variant of
FA, or is a distinct disorder (Frith, 2004;Macintosh&Dissanayake,
004; Matson & Wilkins, 2007). Although the present findings can-
ot offer decisive evidence in favor of one position or the other,
hey make it clear that collapsing data across the whole ASD group
ayobscure importantdifferencesbetweenHFAandAsperger syn-
rome.
In conclusion, the most striking finding in this study was that
ontext – sentence context as well as reasoning context – had
n immediate ERP effect in adults with Asperger syndrome, as in
atched controls, while the HFA group failed to demonstrate angia 48 (2010) 2940–2951
immediate ERP effect, though at the behavioral level they showed
a normal response pattern. Because sentence context had a mod-
ulating effect in a later phase, semantic integration is perhaps less
automatic in HFA, and presumably more elaborate processes are
needed to arrive at a sentence interpretation. Both the sentence
conditions and the reasoning conditions suggest that participants
with HFA made use of context information, but in a less automatic
and more effortful way.
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